Tuesday, July 21, 2015
Thursday, February 13, 2014
When Media Become Lapdogs Rather Than Watchdogs
A little over a week has passed since police
stormed the Musa Mosque in Mombasa, and killed
up to 9 people whom they accused of participating in a "jihadist
convention." Nearly 130 others, including children were arrested -58 have
since been released- and the rest charged with offences under Kenya’s terrorism
act. The police claim to have recovered terror training materials and
information indicating plans to attack an "unspecified target."
I think there is a lot that is disconcerting about how this story is being told and the assumptions that have been made. There is little questioning of the government narrative. The media appears to have already made up its mind about what happened and has entirely ignored alternative versions of what happened.
Some things just don't seem to gel with the “official truth”. To begin with, this was no secret meeting. The media has reported that the convention was openly advertised on posters pasted across town and on social media postings and that the authorities were well aware of it. There is also considerable confusion over who called the meeting and what exactly was to be discussed. The Standard reported there were lectures “on various topics justifying jihad, claiming conspiracies against Muslims and exhorting the faithful to prepare for ishtishhaad (life of sacrifice)”. However, Sheikh Abdallah Kheir, an imam and lecturer of sociology at Kenyatta University, told the press the meeting had been advertised merely as a religious lecture. Some of those who claimed to have been there also seemed unaware they were attending a "jihadist convention."
Further, it is unclear whether the meeting had been prohibited (which would raise fundamental issues surrounding the legality of any such a ban, and the impact on constitutionally-guaranteed freedoms of assembly and speech -issues that the press has not bothered to address.) The press reported that "authorities in Mombasa" had said they "would not allow it to take place." But these "authorities" do not appear to have made any effort to inform the organizers that their meeting had been disallowed. Though in the aftermath of the raid, the Mombasa County Police Commander was quoted as saying: "'we' had issued a warning that we will not allow such a meeting because it was illegal," other reports indicated that the Mombasa County Security Committee made no attempt to stop it "anticipating that known hardcore jihadists would attend it." In fact, "attending an illegal meeting" does not appear to be one of the charges levelled in court in relation with the incident.
As I write this, the government has reportedly arrested three persons in the capital, Nairobi, after police broke up a citizens' protest they had themselves cleared. The demonstration, led by the activist Boniface Mwangi and the widely respected Rev Timothy Njoya, was supposedly outlawed by the shadowy National Security Advisory Council which accused the US Agency for International Development of plotting to topple the government by financing demonstrations. Again, as the press has dutifully parroted the government's ridiculous allegations and ignored the constitutional issues, no one asks why it appears that the authorities once again appear to have made no effort to inform organizers that their event was “banned” or which law gave them the power to do so.
Going back to Mombasa, I am also greatly concerned at the terms employed in the coverage, much of which mirrors the distorted and lazy international reporting on seemingly all matters Muslim. The press has branded the meeting an "outlawed jihadist convention" and taken to calling those arrested (and, it would seem, pretty much any collection of young men at the coast) "militants" or "radicalized youth". We hear of "jihadist" flags and banners (apparently any black cloth with Arabic-looking script) and everyday household items, including scissors, a pair of pliers and a screwdriver, described as "weapons". There's a disturbing vagueness about what is meant by radicalization. Who gets to decide who is a "radical preacher", which youngsters have been "radicalized", and what a nice "moderate" Muslim looks and sound like?
A few days after the Masjid Musa raid, a mob in Kisumu defaced and forced the removal of a monument put up to commemorate a century of Sikh presence in Kenya's third-largest city. In the days leading up to the destruction of the statue,Christian preachers were openly inciting their followers claiming the structure was "satanic" and attributing weather phenomena to its erection. Despite this, no one called for regulation of sermons in Kisumu, the shutting down of “radical preachers” in favor of “moderate Christians” or characterized the violent youths as “militant” or “radicalized”.
It is clear that the government has for a long time been uncomfortable with rising political consciousness at the coast and elsewhere. Its standard response however has been one of demonization while continuing to ignore the underlying grievances. Its dealings with civil society critiques or the Mombasa Republican Council, for example, demonstrate this clearly enough.
While there may be areas of legitimate security concerns, such as recruitment into terror outfits like Al Shabaab and possible terror plots, this does not give authorities carte blanche to ignore constitutional limits and to deny fundamental freedoms. The constitution exists primarily to constrain the power of government, not the rights of citizens. Thus we really should be worried when government sets itself up as the public censor, purports to ban speech and speakers it does not like and uses "national security" as an excuse to close down the space for political expression and protests.
Unfortunately, our press, more lapdog than watchdog, has largely failed to question the motives and (mis)deeds of the people in power. As we have seen before, it is ever happier cozying up to them and helping to delegitimize their opponents. Like the mob in Kisumu, it is quick to desecrate and deface, and slow to think and question.
I think there is a lot that is disconcerting about how this story is being told and the assumptions that have been made. There is little questioning of the government narrative. The media appears to have already made up its mind about what happened and has entirely ignored alternative versions of what happened.
Some things just don't seem to gel with the “official truth”. To begin with, this was no secret meeting. The media has reported that the convention was openly advertised on posters pasted across town and on social media postings and that the authorities were well aware of it. There is also considerable confusion over who called the meeting and what exactly was to be discussed. The Standard reported there were lectures “on various topics justifying jihad, claiming conspiracies against Muslims and exhorting the faithful to prepare for ishtishhaad (life of sacrifice)”. However, Sheikh Abdallah Kheir, an imam and lecturer of sociology at Kenyatta University, told the press the meeting had been advertised merely as a religious lecture. Some of those who claimed to have been there also seemed unaware they were attending a "jihadist convention."
Further, it is unclear whether the meeting had been prohibited (which would raise fundamental issues surrounding the legality of any such a ban, and the impact on constitutionally-guaranteed freedoms of assembly and speech -issues that the press has not bothered to address.) The press reported that "authorities in Mombasa" had said they "would not allow it to take place." But these "authorities" do not appear to have made any effort to inform the organizers that their meeting had been disallowed. Though in the aftermath of the raid, the Mombasa County Police Commander was quoted as saying: "'we' had issued a warning that we will not allow such a meeting because it was illegal," other reports indicated that the Mombasa County Security Committee made no attempt to stop it "anticipating that known hardcore jihadists would attend it." In fact, "attending an illegal meeting" does not appear to be one of the charges levelled in court in relation with the incident.
As I write this, the government has reportedly arrested three persons in the capital, Nairobi, after police broke up a citizens' protest they had themselves cleared. The demonstration, led by the activist Boniface Mwangi and the widely respected Rev Timothy Njoya, was supposedly outlawed by the shadowy National Security Advisory Council which accused the US Agency for International Development of plotting to topple the government by financing demonstrations. Again, as the press has dutifully parroted the government's ridiculous allegations and ignored the constitutional issues, no one asks why it appears that the authorities once again appear to have made no effort to inform organizers that their event was “banned” or which law gave them the power to do so.
Going back to Mombasa, I am also greatly concerned at the terms employed in the coverage, much of which mirrors the distorted and lazy international reporting on seemingly all matters Muslim. The press has branded the meeting an "outlawed jihadist convention" and taken to calling those arrested (and, it would seem, pretty much any collection of young men at the coast) "militants" or "radicalized youth". We hear of "jihadist" flags and banners (apparently any black cloth with Arabic-looking script) and everyday household items, including scissors, a pair of pliers and a screwdriver, described as "weapons". There's a disturbing vagueness about what is meant by radicalization. Who gets to decide who is a "radical preacher", which youngsters have been "radicalized", and what a nice "moderate" Muslim looks and sound like?
A few days after the Masjid Musa raid, a mob in Kisumu defaced and forced the removal of a monument put up to commemorate a century of Sikh presence in Kenya's third-largest city. In the days leading up to the destruction of the statue,Christian preachers were openly inciting their followers claiming the structure was "satanic" and attributing weather phenomena to its erection. Despite this, no one called for regulation of sermons in Kisumu, the shutting down of “radical preachers” in favor of “moderate Christians” or characterized the violent youths as “militant” or “radicalized”.
It is clear that the government has for a long time been uncomfortable with rising political consciousness at the coast and elsewhere. Its standard response however has been one of demonization while continuing to ignore the underlying grievances. Its dealings with civil society critiques or the Mombasa Republican Council, for example, demonstrate this clearly enough.
While there may be areas of legitimate security concerns, such as recruitment into terror outfits like Al Shabaab and possible terror plots, this does not give authorities carte blanche to ignore constitutional limits and to deny fundamental freedoms. The constitution exists primarily to constrain the power of government, not the rights of citizens. Thus we really should be worried when government sets itself up as the public censor, purports to ban speech and speakers it does not like and uses "national security" as an excuse to close down the space for political expression and protests.
Unfortunately, our press, more lapdog than watchdog, has largely failed to question the motives and (mis)deeds of the people in power. As we have seen before, it is ever happier cozying up to them and helping to delegitimize their opponents. Like the mob in Kisumu, it is quick to desecrate and deface, and slow to think and question.
Sunday, September 15, 2013
PAMBAZUKA NEWS: INSIDE THE MEDIA IN AFRICA: SPECIAL ISSUE
INSIDE THE MEDIA IN
AFRICA: INTRODUCTION TO THE SPECIAL ISSUE
Henry Makori
The media landscape in Africa is quite diverse. Campaigns for media freedom and freedom of expression have resulted in the repeal of repressive laws in some countries, but old and new challenges persist. There are interesting debates about the place of the media in the continent's development
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/88877
THE KENYAN MEDIA'S 'MOVE ON' MANTRA
Rasna Warah
Local media coverage of the 2013 Kenyan elections downplayed acts of violence and bordered on self-censorship despite the fact that social media reflected a deeply politically and ethnically divided society. The new Kenyatta government has now embarked on a charm offensive to co-opt the media
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/88864
ELECTIONS 2013: HOW THE MEDIA FAILED KENYA
Henry Makori
The media in Kenya continues to be the target of intense criticism over its coverage of the elections in March. It is thought to have shirked its watchdog role and focused on peace messages. But supporters say that was necessary, given the circumstances
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/88874
KENYA'S MEDIA BATTLES IDENTITY CRISIS
Abdullahi Boru Halakhe
By easily relinquishing a critical agenda setting role, the mainstream media in Kenya appears to have given up on its well-earned position as an accessory to the second liberation for which it paid a steep price. Today, media content is generally vacuous
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/88878
THE CHANGING FABRIC OF KENYAN SOCIETY
Aamera Jiwaji
A study of how young Kenyan women engage with Cuando Seas Mia suggests that the Mexican telenovela is not a cultural imperialist product but one that helps them redefine their identities as modern African women
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/88873
Henry Makori
The media landscape in Africa is quite diverse. Campaigns for media freedom and freedom of expression have resulted in the repeal of repressive laws in some countries, but old and new challenges persist. There are interesting debates about the place of the media in the continent's development
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/88877
THE KENYAN MEDIA'S 'MOVE ON' MANTRA
Rasna Warah
Local media coverage of the 2013 Kenyan elections downplayed acts of violence and bordered on self-censorship despite the fact that social media reflected a deeply politically and ethnically divided society. The new Kenyatta government has now embarked on a charm offensive to co-opt the media
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/88864
ELECTIONS 2013: HOW THE MEDIA FAILED KENYA
Henry Makori
The media in Kenya continues to be the target of intense criticism over its coverage of the elections in March. It is thought to have shirked its watchdog role and focused on peace messages. But supporters say that was necessary, given the circumstances
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/88874
KENYA'S MEDIA BATTLES IDENTITY CRISIS
Abdullahi Boru Halakhe
By easily relinquishing a critical agenda setting role, the mainstream media in Kenya appears to have given up on its well-earned position as an accessory to the second liberation for which it paid a steep price. Today, media content is generally vacuous
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/88878
THE CHANGING FABRIC OF KENYAN SOCIETY
Aamera Jiwaji
A study of how young Kenyan women engage with Cuando Seas Mia suggests that the Mexican telenovela is not a cultural imperialist product but one that helps them redefine their identities as modern African women
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/88873
Wednesday, September 4, 2013
Monday, September 2, 2013
Saturday, August 31, 2013
ICNC - July 2013 posts
By: Alice Driver, School of
Authentic Journalism, May 15, 2013
The important role Mary King played in
helping to advance the struggle for women's rights is a lesser known story of
how the success of one social movement, the U.S. civil rights struggle, helped
to expand the space for another movement. King spoke recently about how her
consciousness of women's rights was shaped by her organizing and media work for
the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee during the civil rights movement,
while attending the Narco News School of Authentic Journalism - an intensive
workshop focused on journalism and social movements held in Mexico in April
By: Theory Talks, June 5, 2013
Nonviolent resistance remains by and large
a marginal topic to international relations. Yet it constitutes an influential
idea among social movements and non-Western populations alike, one that has
moved to the center stage in recent events in the Middle East. In this talk,
Mary King-who has spent over 40 years promoting nonviolence-elaborates on,
amongst others, the women's movement, nonviolence, and civil action more
broadly.
By: Narco News TV, May 15, 2013
In 1985, Mkhuseli "Khusta" Jack
organized a consumer boycott in the city of Port Elizabeth, South Africa, which
helped end racial apartheid. In 2000, Oscar Olivera was the spokesperson for a
popular resistance that stopped the privatization of water in Cochabamba,
Bolivia. In 2013, they met face to face and shared their stories of strategic
organizing with the scholars and professors of the School of Authentic
Journalism.
By: Carole Reckinger, Erenlai
Magazine, April 23, 2013
Since 2007, a small village in the island
of Jeju, South Korea, has led a nonviolent resistance against the construction
of a naval base next door to a UNESCO biosphere reserve. The military base had
been planned to enable better policing of the sea-lanes and faster response to
any acts of aggression by North Korea. The Jeju anti-naval base protests and
their persistence and endurance in the face of mainstream media demonization,
raising fines and government pressure, is a sign of a civil society awakening
in South Korea.
By: Peter Ackerman, Deutsche
Welle, May 28, 2013
With tactics such as strikes, boycotts, and
mass demonstrations, civil resistance spurs defections among supporters of
oppressive regimes. This strategy of dissolving their capacity to use power is
more likely to be effective than violent uprisings. The international community
must stop being mesmerized by the false choice of accommodating or attacking
tyrants and should pay attention to history's verdict: The very people who are
oppressed, if they know how to use civil resistance, can win their rights through
their own initiative.
By: Kevin O'Connor, Times
Argus, May 26, 2013
Think bombs are more powerful than sit-ins, strikes or boycotts? Vermont native Maria J. Stephan has proof war is no match for nonviolent opposition. Maria J. Stephan and Erica Chenoweth teamed up to write the book "Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict," a statistical analysis of more than 300 global campaigns over the past century that is the first definitive study of its kind. "The most striking finding," the authors conclude, "is that between 1900 and 2006, nonviolent resistance campaigns were nearly twice as likely to achieve full or partial success as their violent counterparts."
Think bombs are more powerful than sit-ins, strikes or boycotts? Vermont native Maria J. Stephan has proof war is no match for nonviolent opposition. Maria J. Stephan and Erica Chenoweth teamed up to write the book "Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict," a statistical analysis of more than 300 global campaigns over the past century that is the first definitive study of its kind. "The most striking finding," the authors conclude, "is that between 1900 and 2006, nonviolent resistance campaigns were nearly twice as likely to achieve full or partial success as their violent counterparts."
By: Andrew Stelzer, NPR, May
25, 2013
What does it mean to be an ally in a
political movement? From white Americans in the civil rights era, to Israelis
in Palestine, to Latino-Americans working with the undocumented...how does one
work to support another's struggle? From Mississippi to Zimbabwe, a
roundtable discussion on the do's and don'ts of how to be an effective ally.
By: Juan Cole, Informed Comment,
May 26, 2013
After a subway official chastised a young
couple in Ankara for kissing in public, internet activists organized a small
flash mob at the Kurtulus metro station in the Turkish capital, where lots of
couples engaged in a public display of affection. They attracted the ire of a
group of religious men, but were protected by the police.
By: Katharina Pfannkuch, Your
Middle East, May 24, 2013
Two years after the revolution, the streets
of Tunisia are more and more in the hands of the Islamists. The Danseurs
Citoyens use art as a weapon of resistance against the new self-appointed moral
guardians in the country: The idea to re-conquer the streets of Tunis was born
immediately after an attack by Islamists on a group of dancers in the capital.
By: Andres Jimenez, Peace and
Conflict Monitor, June 12, 2013
This article discusses the shortcomings of
violent social struggles - their relative exclusivity, vulnerability to foreign
manipulation for geostrategic goals, and their likelihood (if successful) to establish
similarly repressive and violent regimes to the ones they seek to overthrow.
These are then juxtaposed with the relative merits of nonviolent struggles -
their inclusivity, self-sufficiency, and compatibility with democratic
structures of governance
By: Loveday Morris, Washington
Post, July 7, 2013
In a Muslim-majority region where women are
often marginalized from politics, women have taken an unusually prominent role
in Western Sahara's independence movement against Moroccan rule. Female
activists attribute the phenomenon to a combination of the indigenous Sahrawi
population's moderate interpretation of Islam and the freedom they derive from
their nomadic roots - but also, perhaps counterintuitively, to the prevalence
of traditional gender roles, which they say give women the time to demonstrate.
By: Sebnem Arsu, NY Times, July
7, 2013
The recent antigovernment riots, which
began with a sit-in at an Istanbul park scheduled for demolition and grew to
encompass the grievances of millions of Turks disillusioned with their
government, have largely faded after an intense crackdown about three weeks
ago. Now, Turkey's parks have become safe places to gather and speak freely,
with people arriving each evening in dozens of parks nationwide to discuss what
happens next. The forums, an unprecedented exercise in grassroots democracy in
a country with no tradition of public assembly, are not affiliated with any
political party.
By: Terry Messman, Street
Spirit, June 7, 2013
Terry Messman interviews Erica Chenoweth
about her recent research on the effectiveness of civil resistance. In
"Why Civil Resistance Works," the book based on this research,
Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan analyze 323 campaigns seeking to change society,
both violently and nonviolently, in one of the most comprehensive studies of
social change movements that exists. Chenoweth speaks about the results of her
research, what led her to undertake the project, and lessons she has learned
that might help illuminate the road ahead for social-change movements.
By: Christiane Gruber,
Jadaliyya, July 7, 2013
Early on in the Gezi protests, Erdogan
dismissed the protesters as "marginal groups" and misbehaving
"çapulcus," a term meaning marauder, riffraff, or bum. Both the terms
"marginal" and "bum" went through the movement's satirical
machinery, and the title of "çapulcu" became the highest badge of
merit for any of the demonstrators.
By: Mohamed El-Sayed Abdel
Gawad, Egypt Independent, July 8, 2013
Tamarod, since its founding, adopted peaceful
methods, enabling it to gain a favorable view among a wide spectrum of society.
Tamarod has taught us that peaceful popular action will be a tool of change in
the future. Traditional political movements, on the other hand, often result in
bloody revolts, military coups, or foreign intervention. To conclude, the
success of Tamarod and earlier youth movements has proved that changes in the
Egyptian political arena are no longer brought about by the traditional elite,
but rather by new political forces that operate outside of partisan boundaries
and engage more effectively with the masses
By: Ariam Frezghi, IPS News,
July 13, 2013
Among the issues bringing protesters to
Gezi Park, the now-iconic site of struggle in Istanbul's Taksim Square, is the
demand for women's liberation. Coming from many walks of life and expressing a
myriad of ideals and values, the women of the Occupy Gezi Movement have voiced
a collective desire: to fight the undercurrent of deeply entrenched patriarchal
values and reclaim autonomy over their own bodies and lifestyles. These demands
are now coalescing around proposed legislation from the country's Health
Ministry to limit the sale of oral contraception.
By: Dana Alexandra Scherle, DW,
July 25, 2013
What is it that connects the
protesters? "What ties them together
is the desire to live in truth. To use the words of Vaclav Havel [in reference
to life under communism during the Cold War], 'they can no longer stand to live
a lie, in a criminal system, in shadows'."
Monday, July 15, 2013
US bankrolled anti-Morsi activists
Documents
reveal US
Emad Mekay
Al Jazeera, 10 Jul 2013
[Condensed version of original article]
But a review of dozens of US federal government
documents shows Washington
Documents obtained by the Investigative Reporting
Program at UC [University of California Berkeley US Middle East region. This programme vigorously
supported activists and politicians who have fomented unrest in Egypt
Activists bankrolled by the programme include an
exiled Egyptian police officer who plotted the violent overthrow of the Morsi
government, an anti-Islamist politician who advocated closing mosques and
dragging preachers out by force, as well as a coterie of opposition politicians
who pushed for the ouster of the country's first democratically elected leader,
government documents show.
Information obtained under the Freedom of Information
Act, interviews, and public records reveal Washington
It may also have broken US government regulations that
ban the use of taxpayers' money to fund foreign politicians, or finance
subversive activities that target democratically elected governments.
'Bureau for
Democracy'
In turn, those groups re-route money to other
organisations such as the International Republican Institute, the National
Democratic Institute (NDI), and Freedom House, among others. Federal documents
show these groups have sent funds to certain organisations in Egypt
A main conduit for channeling the State Department's
democracy funds to Egypt
This appears to be in direct contradiction to its
Congressional mandate, which clearly states NED is to engage only in
"peaceful" political change overseas.
Exiled
policeman
Colonel Omar Afifi Soliman - who served in Egypt
During that time he and his followers targeted
Mubarak's government, and Soliman later followed the same tactics against the
military rulers who briefly replaced him. Most recently Soliman set his sights
on Morsi's government.
Soliman, who has refugee status in the US Cairo Israel Saudi Arabia US
He also used social media to encourage violent attacks
against Egyptian officials, according to court documents and a review of his
social media posts.
US Internal Revenue Service documents reveal that NED
paid tens of thousands of dollars to Soliman through an organisation he created
called Hukuk Al-Nas (People's Rights), based in Falls Church, Virginia. Federal
forms show he is the only employee.
After he was awarded a 2008 human rights fellowship at
NED and moved to the US
INED has removed public access to its Egyptian grant
recipients in 2011 and 2012 from its website. NED officials didn't respond to
repeated interview requests.
'Pro bono
advice'
NED's website says Soliman spreads only nonviolent
literature, and his group was set up to provide "immediate, pro bono
[free] legal advice through a telephone hotline, instant messaging, and other
social networking tools".
However, in Egyptian media interviews, social media
posts and YouTube videos, Soliman encouraged the violent overthrow of Egypt
"Incapacitate them by smashing their knee bones
first," he instructed followers on Facebook in late June, as Morsi's
opponents prepared massive street rallies against the government. Egypt
"Make a road bump with a broken palm tree to stop
the buses going into Cairo
In late May he instructed, "Behead those who
control power, water and gas utilities."
More recent Facebook instructions to his 83,000
followers range from guidelines on spraying roads with a mix of auto oil and
gas - "20 litres of oil to 4 litres of gas"- to how to thwart cars
giving chase.
On a YouTube video, Soliman took credit for a failed
attempt in December to storm the Egyptian presidential palace with handguns and
Molotov cocktails to oust Morsi.
Funding
other Morsi opponents
Other beneficiaries of US
The Salvation Front main opposition bloc, of which
some members received US funding, has backed street protest campaigns that
turned violent against the elected government, in contradiction of many of the
State Department's own guidelines.
A long-time grantee of the National Endowment for
Democracy and other US
She exhorted activists to lay siege to mosques and
drag from pulpits all Muslim preachers and religious figures who supported the
country's the proposed constitution, just before it went to a public
referendum.
The act of besieging mosques has continued ever since,
and several people have died in clashes defending them.
Federal records show Abdel-Fatah's NGO, the Egyptian
Democratic Academy, received support from NED, MEPI and NDI, among other State
Department-funded groups "assisting democracy". Records show NED gave
her organisation a one-year $75,000 grant in 2011.
Abdel-Fatah is politically active, crisscrossing Egypt
"June 30 will be the last day of Morsi's
term," she told the press a few weeks before the coup took place.
Michael Meunier is a frequent guest on TV channels
that opposed Morsi. Head of the Al-Haya Party, Meunier - a dual US-Egyptian
citizen - has quietly collected US funding through his NGO, Hand In Hand for
Egypt Association.
Meunier's organisation was founded by some of the most
vehement opposition figures, including Egypt's richest man and well-known
Coptic Christian billionaire Naguib Sawiris, Tarek Heggy, an oil industry
executive, Salah Diab, Halliburton's partner in Egypt, and Usama Ghazali Harb,
a politician with roots in the Mubarak regime and a frequent US embassy
contact.
Meunier has denied receiving US US
Meunier helped rally the country's five million
Christian Orthodox Coptic minority, who oppose Morsi's Islamist agenda, to take
to the streets against the president on June 30.
Reform and Development Party member Mohammed Essmat
al-Sadat received US
The federal grants records and database show in 2011
Sadat collected $84,445 from MEPI "to work with youth in the
post-revolutionary Egypt
Sadat was a member of the coordination committee, the
main organising body for the June 30 anti-Morsi protest. Since 2008, he has
collected $265,176 in US funding. Sadat announced he will be running for office
again in upcoming parliamentary elections.
After soldiers and police killed more than 50 Morsi
supporters on Monday, Sadat defended the use of force and blamed the Muslim
Brotherhood, saying it used women and children as shields.
Some US-backed politicians have said Washington
"We were told by the Americans that if we see big
street protests that sustain themselves for a week, they will reconsider all
current US policies towards the Muslim Brotherhood regime," said Saaddin
Ibrahim, an Egyptian-American politician opposed Morsi.
Ibrahim's Ibn Khaldoun Center in Cairo US
His comments followed statements by other Egyptian
opposition politicians claiming they had been prodded by US officials to whip
up public sentiment against Morsi before Washington
Democracy
programme defence
The practice of funding politicians and
anti-government activists through NGOs was vehemently defended by the State
Department and by a group of Washington-based Middle East
experts close to the programme.
"The line between politics and activism is very
blurred in this country," said David Linfield, spokesman for the US
Embassy in Cairo
Others said the United
States
A Cairo Egypt US
Some Egyptians, meanwhile, said the US Middle
East to organisations run by political operators.
"Instead of being sincere about backing democracy
and reaching out to the Egyptian people, the US has chosen an unethical
path," said Esam Neizamy, an independent researcher into foreign funding
in Egypt, and a member of the country's Revolutionary Trustees, a group set up
to protect the 2011 revolution.
Excuses for the
Egyptian coup
Excerpt
from: ‘Egyptian Coup Apologists Offer Lame Rationalizations’, by Haroon
Siddiqui, the Toronto Star’s Editorial Page Editor Emeritus
Apologists
for the Egyptian coup, including many Egyptian Canadians, are offering
lame
rationalizations:
1. The
situation was chaotic and the economy in ruins — someone had to restore order.
That’s the
standard excuse for military coups. Besides, the army itself encouraged the
undermining
of Morsi by Mubarak-era courts, Mubarak-era police and Mubarak-era
financiers
who backed mass demonstrations. They created the upheavals that killed
tourism and
stifled the economy.
2. Morsi
only controlled the parliament where his Muslim Brotherhood had nearly half
the seats.
But the assembly was dismissed by the courts, leaving him only his own
elected
legitimacy — and that was what was systematically destroyed.
3. Morsi
was partisan and unilateral. He was — but far less so than, say, Stephen
Harper and
the Republicans in Congress. He appointed no more party loyalists and
nincompoops
than [Canadian Prime Minister] Harper has to the Senate or other public
institutions.
4. Morsi
had only a “narrow mandate,” at 52 per cent in a two-way race. But his was a
bigger
margin than Obama’s. And in multi-party elections, the Brotherhood
proportionately
won more seats than either Harper’s or [UK Pfime Minister] David Cameron’s
Conservatives.
5. Morsi
was taking orders from the Muslim Brotherhood. He no doubt was but no
more so
than members of the [U.S.] Congress sing their key funders’ tunes.
6. He was
advancing sharia or he may have been preparing to do so. In fact, he fought
off
Salafist demands for constitutional guarantees for Islamic law.
Sudden Improvements in Egypt Suggest a Campaign to Undermine Morsi
By BEN HUBBARD and DAVID
D. KIRKPATRICK
New York Times, July 10, 2013
The apparently miraculous end to the crippling energy
shortages, and the re-emergence of the police, seems to show that the legions
of personnel left in place after former President Hosni Mubarak was ousted in
2011 played a significant role — intentionally or not — in undermining the
overall quality of life under the Islamist administration of Mr. Morsi.
And as the interim government struggles to unite a
divided nation, the Muslim Brotherhood and Mr. Morsi’s supporters say the
sudden turnaround proves that their opponents conspired to make Mr. Morsi fail.
Not only did police officers seem to disappear, but the state agencies
responsible for providing electricity and ensuring gas supplies failed so
fundamentally that gas lines and rolling blackouts fed widespread anger and
frustration.
“This was preparing for the coup,” said Naser el-Farash,
who served as the spokesman for the Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade under
Mr. Morsi. “Different circles in the state, from the storage facilities to the
cars that transport petrol products to the gas stations, all participated in
creating the crisis.”
Working behind the scenes, members of the old
establishment, some of them close to Mr. Mubarak and the country’s top
generals, also helped finance, advise and organize those determined to topple
the Islamist leadership, including Naguib Sawiris, a billionaire and an
outspoken foe of the Brotherhood; Tahani El-Gebali, a former judge on the
Supreme Constitutional Court who is close to the ruling generals; and Shawki
al-Sayed, a legal adviser to Ahmed Shafik, Mr. Mubarak’s last prime minister,
who lost the presidential race to Mr. Morsi.
But it is the police returning to the streets that offers
the most blatant sign that the institutions once loyal to Mr. Mubarak held back
while Mr. Morsi was in power. Throughout his one-year tenure, Mr. Morsi
struggled to appease the police, even alienating his own supporters rather than
trying to overhaul the Interior Ministry. But as crime increased and traffic
clogged roads — undermining not only the quality of life, but the economy — the
police refused to deploy fully.
Until now.
White-clad officers have returned to Cairo’s streets, and
security forces — widely despised before and after the revolution — intervened
with tear gas and shotguns against Islamists during widespread street clashes
last week, leading anti-Morsi rioters to laud them as heroes. Posters have gone
up around town showing a police officer surrounded by smiling children over the
words “Your security is our mission, your safety our goal.”
“You had officers and individuals who were working under
a specific policy that was against Islamic extremists and Islamists in
general,” said Ihab Youssef, a retired police officer who runs a professional
association for the security forces. “Then all of a sudden the regime flips and
there is an Islamic regime ruling. They could never psychologically accept
that.”
When Mr. Mubarak was removed after nearly 30 years in
office in 2011, the bureaucracy he built stayed largely in place. Many business
leaders, also a pillar of the old government, retained their wealth and
influence.
Despite coming to power through the freest elections in
Egyptian history, Mr. Morsi was unable to extend his authority over the
sprawling state apparatus, and his allies complained that what they called the
“deep state” was undermining their efforts at governing.
While he failed to broaden his appeal and build any kind
of national consensus, he also faced an active campaign by those hostile to his
leadership, including some of the wealthiest and most powerful pillars of the
Mubarak era.
Mr. Sawiris, one of Egypt’s richest men and a titan of
the old establishment, said Wednesday that he had supported an upstart group
called “tamarrod,” Arabic for “rebellion,” that led a petition drive seeking
Mr. Morsi’s ouster. He donated use of the nationwide offices and infrastructure
of the political party he built, the Free Egyptians. He provided publicity
through his popular television network and his major interest in Egypt’s
largest private newspaper. He even commissioned the production of a popular
music video that played heavily on his network.
“Tamarrod did not even know it was me!” he said. “I am
not ashamed of it.”
He said he had publicly predicted that ousting Mr. Morsi
would bolster Egypt’s sputtering economy because it would bring in billions of
dollars in aid from oil-rich monarchies afraid that the Islamist movement might
spread to their shores. By Wednesday, a total of $12 billion had flowed in from
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait. “That will take us for 12
months with no problem,” Mr. Sawiris said.
Ms. Gebali, the former judge, said in a telephone
interview on Wednesday that she and other legal experts helped tamarrod create
its strategy to appeal directly to the military to oust Mr. Morsi and pass the
interim presidency to the chief of the constitutional court.
“We saw that there was movement and popular creativity,
so we wanted to see if it would have an effect and a constitutional basis,” Ms.
Gebali said.
Mr. Farash, the trade ministry spokesman under Mr. Morsi,
attributed the fuel shortages to black marketers linked to Mr. Mubarak, who
diverted shipments of state-subsidized fuel to sell for a profit abroad.
Corrupt officials torpedoed Mr. Morsi’s introduction of a smart card system to
track fuel shipments by refusing to use the devices, he said.
But not everyone agreed with that interpretation, as
supporters of the interim government said the improvements in recent days were
a reflection of Mr. Morsi’s incompetence, not a conspiracy. State news media
said energy shortages occurred because consumers bought extra fuel out of fear,
which appeared to evaporate after Mr. Morsi’s fall. On Wednesday, Al Ahram, the
flagship newspaper, said the energy grid had had a surplus in the past week for
the first time in months, thanks to “energy-saving measures by the public.”
“I feel like Egypt is back,” Ayman Abdel-Hakam, a
criminal court judge from a Cairo suburb, said after waiting only a few minutes
to fill up his car at a downtown gas station. He accused Mr. Morsi and the
Muslim Brotherhood of trying to seize all state power and accused them of
creating the fuel crisis by exporting gasoline to Hamas, the militant Islamic
group in the Gaza Strip.
“We had a disease, and we got rid of it,” Mr. Abdel-Hakam
said.
Ahmed Nabawi, a gas station manager, said he had heard
several reasons for the gas crisis: technical glitches at a storage facility, a
shipment of low-quality gas from abroad and unnecessary stockpiling by the
public. Still, he was amazed at how quickly the crisis disappeared.
“We went to sleep one night, woke up the next day, and
the crisis was gone,” he said, casually sipping tea in his office with his
colleagues.
Regardless of the reasons behind the crisis, he said, Mr.
Morsi’s rule had not helped.
“No one wanted to cooperate with his people because they
didn’t accept him,” he said. “Now that he is gone, they are working like
they’re supposed to.”
Saturday, July 6, 2013
ICNC posts - 4 May 2013
By: Thabani Nyoni, Zimbabwe Independent, May 3, 2013
Zimbabwe has seen a plethora of opposition
political parties, civil society groups and human rights organizations as well
as dissenting voices being criminalized, delegitimized and brutalized. This
culture of violence, intolerance and impunity has thrived as the government
uses terms like "sell-outs", "puppets of the West", and
"Western-sponsored agents of regime change" to justify political
persecution. Civil society groups and human rights activists have worked to
expand, democratize and maintain a vibrant and legitimate public sphere in
Zimbabwe, which is a legitimate democratic regime agenda.
By: Gregory Warner, NPR, May 2, 2013
Eritrea's President Isaias Afwerki does not
tolerate any independent media, the Internet is restricted, and Reporters
without Borders recently named it 179th out of 179 countries for freedom of
expression. Isayas Sium, an Eritrean-American exile, had an idea to
subversively protest against the government: robocall Eritreans with a smuggled
phonebook and tell them not to go out as traditional on Friday night. They
called the movement "Freedom Friday." According to one activist,
Eritreans are "...not as fearful as she thought they'd be, as according to
inside sources and recent refugees who've fled, staying home on Friday nights
is becoming kind of cool
By: Adam Clayton Powell III, Good Governance Africa, May 2, 2013
Citizen journalists, mostly untrained volunteer
newscasters, activists and whistle-blowers can take advantage of powerful new
technologies, many created in Africa, to collect and distribute their reports.
The power and ubiquity of inexpensive, low-end cellphones has increased, making
possible access to tools that can help spread information and safeguard
anonymity. For example, Mimiboard, a virtual noticeboard, won the most
votes at last year's Open Innovation Africa Summit and enables users to post,
via the web or SMS, events and information about social and political issues in
their communities - particularly when these citizen journalists and
activists who may not be able to operate openly.
By: Felicity Clarke, School for Authentic Journalism, April 24,
2013
For more than twenty years, Brazilian
authorities have maintained that the Vila Autódromo favela in Rio de Janeiro's
west zone doesn't belong and have attempted to remove it, citing aesthetic
damage, environmental damage, environmental risk and, more recently Olympic
Park developments as reasons. The community continues to resist, knowing their
legal right to the land and creating an alternative upgrading plan for the
community at a lower cost than relocation. This is where the School of
Authentic Journalism comes in: reporting for RioOnWatch in the last year, I
have been learning how journalism can empower people, even whole communities.
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